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A commonly held view is that ﬁscal federalism promotes innovative public programs,
speeds up the process of policy experimentation and its diﬀusion. This view is rooted
in the argument that the division of the economy into a number of independent local
authorities gives them the opportunity to independently experiment with new policies.1
However satisfactory this argument is it neglects the political economy dimension of the
process of policy experimentation. As emphasised also by Besley (2000) whether or not
innovative policies are indeed carried out depends to a large extent on the incentives
faced by politicians.2
In spite of the vast and growing political economy literature the interactions between
experimentation and political incentives have been surprisingly neglected. It is the ob-
jective of this paper to provide a ﬁrst step towards an analysis of these interactions.
The starting point is the observation that innovative policies might be a natural vehi-
cle for selﬁsh politicians to appropriate rents without being detected, and consequently
punished, in the elections. By the very nature of an experiment, one does not know in
advance whether the experimenting policy is indeed better than an alternative and well
known policy. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that, after having experimented,
politicians have superior information about the quality of the policy than the citizens.
This advantage in information can be exploited by a rent-seeking politician. When faced
with an unsatisfactory outcome voters do not know whether the experiment has been
unsuccessful or whether the experiment was successful but the politician has diverted
some of the beneﬁts to herself. This ignorance gives the opportunity to selﬁsh politicians
to mimick a benevolent but unlucky politician.
Such behaviour would be prevented, or to a large extent mitigated, if voters had ac-
cess to additional external information they could use in order to evaluate the observed
outcome. In the context of federalism this information can naturally be thought of as
coming from a neighboring jurisdiction. Voters may exploit the information gathered
from jurisdictions with the similar characteristics in order to evaluate the performance
of their own politicians. If, for instance, the same policy experiment has been carried
out elsewhere then voters could infer the type of their politician by simply comparing
the outcomes realised in their own jurisdiction to those realised in those other jurisdic-
tions.3 Although the present paper is motivated by the ﬁscal federalism literature the
analysis can equally well be applied more widely. This is because, in general, any source
of external information will have similar consequences on political competition and ex-
perimentation. As an example consider the arrival of the internet which undoubtedly
1See, for instance, Oates (1999), Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), and Kollman et al. (1999).
2This view is shared by many political commentators too. In a commentary, for example, J. Podhoretz
notes, ‘...although he is not a bold politician, Bush is an innovator. On all these issues [education, social
security and medicare] he has fresh proposals that derive from state and local politics – from experiments
by the Republican governors like himself who have come to dominate the 50 state capitals.’ The Times,
October 13, 2000. Commentary: ‘Gore has made his bed, but nobody wants to lie in it.’ Bold face
emphasis added.
3This is consistent with the agency theory which argues that the incentives for agents in correlated
environments should be based on their relative performance, Holmstr¨ om (1982). Besley and Case (1995)
provide evidence for relative performance evaluation of politicians in the U.S.
1has facilitated access to external information. As explored by Besley and Burgess (2001)
and Str¨ omberg (2000) the information provided by the media may play an important
role in enhancing political competition by increasing the scrutiny of policies.
External information at the same time creates an externality which aﬀects the incentives
to experiment. If the politicians expect to be informed about the quality of the innovative
policy they might be reluctant to incur the cost associated with the experimented policy.4
Thus, the presence of external information creates a tension between the working of the
political system and the extent of innovation.
This paper presents a model that investigates the interaction between the democratic
system and the incentives to innovate. Speciﬁcally, we ask: (a) How well does a politico-
economic system with elections work in separating selﬁsh from benevolent politicians and
providing innovative policies in equilibrium? and, (b) How does the interaction between
the democratic system and the incentives to innovate change as the external information
is enhanced?
The model features two types of politicians, a selﬁsh and a benevolent one, who decide
whether to innovate or to continue using an old policy and whether to divert rents
to themselves. The use of the innovative policy provides the selﬁsh politician with
the opportunity to appropriate rents without being detected but it also provides useful
information for the future. External information regarding the new policy becomes
available and shapes voters’ election decision aﬀecting at the same time the incentives
to innovate. Since each type of politician may choose the new or the old policy there
are four possible equilibrium conﬁgurations. We provide conditions under which each of
these equilibria exists. Also we investigate how the equilibria behave as more external
information becomes available. Finally, we look at voters’ welfare. Surprisingly, we
show that an increase in external information may reduce welfare. This is because the
selﬁsh politician is detected more often and so reacts by behaving more aggressively
experimenting at the same time less frequently. On balance this cost is greater than the
beneﬁt from detecting the selﬁsh politician.
The model combines features from the models presented in Besley and Case (1995), and
Coate and Morris (1995). In addition to Coate and Morris (1995) we incorporate learning
externalities. Recent multi-jurisdiction extensions of Coate and Morris (1995) are Besley
and Smart (2001), Belleﬂamme and Hindriks (2001), and Hindriks and Makris (2001).
Besley and Smart (2001) analyse the impact of enhanced tax competition on the political
equilibrium. Belleﬂamme and Hindriks (2001) analyse the impact of inter-jurisdictional
comparisons on the political system whereas Hindriks and Makris (2001) focus on ﬁscal
competition as a device to tame selﬁsh politicians. Contrary to all these contributions
we focus on the incentives of the politicians to experiment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses the
second period choices while section 4 describes the citizen’s beliefs. Section 5 analyses the
equilibria of the model and presents the comparative statics results. Section 6 provides
results on welfare. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
4Walker (1969) oﬀers an early study of innovation and diﬀusion of innovation between the U.S. states
emphasising the importance of learning externalities. Strumpf (2000) identiﬁes conditions under which,
due to this type of externality, a decentralised system induces too little experimentation.
22 Description of the model
We consider a dynamic two period model which incorporates signaling.5 In both periods
politicians decide whether to introduce a new and innovative public policy, denoted by
n, or to continue using an old public policy denoted by o. The quality of the policy is
denoted by q. The return of the innovative policy is probabilistic; with probability6 θ
its quality7 is high qh, and with complementary probability 1−θ low, ql. The quality of
the old policy is qo with certainty. It is assumed that the new policy could be superior
or inferior to the old policy, that is qh > qo > ql.8 After having chosen policy in each
period the politician can make transfers to herself denoted by τ.
A single representative citizen derives utility u = q − τ from public policy. The only
decision the citizen makes in this framework is whether to reelect the incumbent at the
end of the ﬁrst period. Voting therefore is retrospective.
In each period the politician must decide which policy to implement and what transfers
to divert towards herself. There are two types of politicians, ‘good’, i = g, and ‘bad’,
i = b. The good politician derives utility only from the utility of the voters and so
maximises the diﬀerence between quality and transfers that is, q − τ. The bad type
places no weight on the utility of the voters. Consequently she is only interested in
transfers τ. If the incumbent is not reelected in the second period her utility is zero.
Second period utility for both types is discounted by δ ∈ (0,1). The choice of transfers
is discrete in the following sense.9 If the quality of the project is qh then the politicians
can appropriate one of the transfers τ ∈ {qh,qh − ql,0}. If the quality is ql they can
appropriate transfers τ ∈ {ql,0} whereas if the old policy is chosen τ ∈ {qo,0}.
There are two kinds of uncertainty; policy and political. Policy uncertainty refers to
the quality of the new policy. Ex ante neither the politicians nor voters know whether
this quality is qh or ql. The quality will be only found out by the politicians if they
choose the new policy. After each policy choice and after the politicians have decided on
transfers external information regarding the true quality of the new policy may become
available to both voters and politicians. This information is denoted by y = qh,ql,∅,
where y = qh (y = ql) means that citizens and politicians are informed that the quality
is high (low). Conditional on the quality being high (low) this occurs with probability
π. With complementary probability 1 − π no such information becomes available. This
is denoted by y = ∅. If the incumbent is defeated in the election the successor has
access to the same information. It is so clear that in the second period politicians are
5It has to be noted though that this is not a typical signaling model because the relationship between
the ‘sender’ and the ‘receiver’ is blurred by the policy uncertainty and external information. Standard
equilibrium reﬁnements in this context, hence, do not work in this context. See also the discussion in
Coate and Morris (1995).
6All probabilities are restricted to be between 0 and 1.
7Policies are costly and, without loss of generality, their cost has been suppressed.
8If this did not hold the issue of experimentation, at the heart of this paper, would not be present.
9This speciﬁcation is innocuous and imposed merely for simplicity. Even with continuous transfers
the structure of the model together with the beliefs speciﬁed below would imply the discrete choice of
transfers assumed here. An earlier version of this paper veriﬁes this.
3informed about the quality of the new policy if they have experimented with it or they
have obtained external information.
Political uncertainty refers to the type of the politicians. The citizens do not know the
type of the politicians and attribute an equal prior probability10 λ to the incumbent
being of either type. Therefore they have to infer it from the signals they observe.
Citizens observe the record r(p,u) consisting of the policy p and utility u = q − τ, and
external information y. They then form beliefs about the type that has produced this
record taking into account external information. The belief µ(r(p,u),y) is the posterior
probability that the incumbent is of the good type given record r(p,u) and information
y.
In the election at the end of the ﬁrst period citizens either vote for the incumbent
or for the challenger. The challenger is of the good type with probability λc. λc is
called reputation and drawn from a uniform cumulative distribution function G with
the property G(1) = 1 and G(0) = 0. Therefore the expected probability that the
challenger is good is EG(λc) = λ. Each type of challenger has the same preferences as
the corresponding type of incumbent. At this stage citizens have all the information
to vote for the incumbent: They observe a record, update their beliefs regarding the
type who generated this record, and compare this probability to the probability that the
challenger is of a certain type.
This model deﬁnes a signaling game between the incumbent, challenger, and voters. At
the beginning of the game Nature chooses the type of the incumbent i ∈ {b,g}. A
strategy for the incumbent has three components. The ﬁrst is a rule that speciﬁes a
policy decision for each type the incumbent might be. The second component is a rule
that speciﬁes a transfer decision in the ﬁrst period for each policy decision. The third
is a rule that speciﬁes the policy choice and transfer decision should the incumbent be
elected. Formally, σp(p|i) gives the probability with which type i = b,g chooses policy
p = n,o, and στ(τ|p,q,i) denotes the probability that type i chooses a transfer τ after
policy p given that the quality of the policy is q. A strategy for the challenger is simply
a rule that speciﬁes the policy and transfer choices should she be elected. A strategy for
the citizen is a rule that speciﬁes for which record, external information, and reputation
of the challenger she reelects the incumbent.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game consists of a strategy for each type of the
incumbent, a strategy for each type of the challenger and a strategy as well as beliefs for
the voters, with the following properties. First, both types of incumbent, both types of
challenger, and the citizen choose optimal strategies at all information sets where they
are called upon to decide, given the strategies and beliefs of the other players. The
second requirement for equilibrium is that the citizens’ beliefs are consistent with the
incumbent’s strategy in the sense that they are generated, whenever possible, by Bayes’
updating. We solve for the equilibrium of the game by means of backwards induction.
10The analysis does not attempt to explore all dimensions of the parameter space of the model. This
simpliﬁcation allows us to focus on the main issue which is the interaction of policy uncertainty with
external information.
43 Second period choices and the election
In this Section we analyse the politician’s choices in the second period after the ﬁrst
period election. Since the challenger has the same preferences as the incumbent of the
(same) type who is voted out the choice of the politician in the second period depends
solely on her type. In the second period politicians have no reelection motives anymore
and thus take the decision which provides them with the highest short run beneﬁt. If
the politician is of type bad and the quality of the policy is qh,ql then she takes transfers
τ = qh,ql with utility qh,ql, respectively. If, on the other hand, the old policy was chosen
she takes τ = qo with utility qo. It then follows that the bad politician always chooses
the unrestricted transfers. Clearly the good politician does not take transfers.
While the good and the bad politician have opposed preferences regarding the choice
of transfers they both want to choose the policy with the highest quality. This choice
depends on whether the quality of the new policy is known. Both types opt for the
new policy whenever the quality is known to be high, following on qh > qo, and the old
whenever the new policy is known to be of low quality, following on ql < qo.
The availability of information regarding the quality of the new policy depends on the
policy choice of the ﬁrst period. Experimentation of the new policy makes the politician
fully informed of the policy’s quality. If the old policy was chosen, in the second period
the elected politician could beneﬁt from externalities that take the form of costless in-
formation provided by other localities. With probability θπ such information regarding
qh becomes available. With probability (1 − θ)π information regarding ql becomes also
available to the politician. In these events the policy choice is clear; the new policy
is optimal in the former, and the old policy is optimal in the latter. With probability
1 − π such information is unavailable and so the politician must evaluate the expected
utility of the new policy and compare it to the beneﬁt of the old policy qo. It then
follows that an uninformed politician chooses in period two the new (old) policy iﬀ
θqh + (1 − θ)ql   (<) qo.11 This consideration implies that the expected discounted
second period payoﬀ of both types is
δ[θπqh + (1 − θ)πqo + (1 − π)max{θqh + (1 − θ)ql;qo}] . (1)
Rent seeking behaviour on the part of the politicians is undesirable for the voters and
therefore they will elect the candidate who has the highest probability of being the
good type. Their choice reduces to a comparison of the belief regarding the type of
the incumbent to the reputation of the challenger that is, voters reelect the incumbent
if and only if µ(r(p,b),y) ≥ λc. The probability of this happening is G(µ(r(p,b),y)).
Because G is uniform the probability of the incumbent being reelected is just the belief
µ(r(p,b),y).
11In order to avoid tedious case distinctions we adopt the following tie-breaking rule. Whenever a
politician is indiﬀerent between both policies she opts for the new one whereas the bad politician in case
of indiﬀerence in transfer choices opts for the maximal transfers.
54 Beliefs
The beliefs in equilibrium must be, whenever possible, computed, for any ﬁrst period
combination of a record and external information that arises with positive probability,






where Pr{j,r(p,u),y} denotes the probability that the incumbent is of type j, record r
was produced and external information y became available to the electorate.
Given the complex interactions of policy uncertainty with the learning and informa-
tional externalities, there is no property that can pin down the citizen’s beliefs out of
equilibrium in any general way. Instead we base the beliefs on the following intuitive
reasoning.12 Voters use all information available to them to infer the type of the politi-
cians and vote out the bad incumbent. Whenever voters can be sure that there were no
transfers, they believe it’s the good type. Similarly, whenever the citizens can ﬁgure out
that a transfer was taken, they infer it is the bad type. This reasoning gives rise to the
beliefs collected in Table 1.
p
n o
u = 0 u = ql u = qh u = 0 u = qo
ql 0 1 − 0 1
y qh 0 0 1 0 1
∅ 0 ? 1 0 1
Table 1: Beliefs.
The table maps, where applicable, the record r, consisting of the policy choice p and
the realised outcome u, together with the information parameter y into the belief µ. To
give an example, consider the belief µ(r(n,ql),qh). This belief can be found by looking
up the column corresponding to the record r(n,ql) and the row for y = qh; that is,
µ(r(n,ql),qh) = 0. The justiﬁcation for this belief is that external information reveals
to voters that transfers have been taken and thus allows them to infer the type of the
politician. Whenever the beneﬁt outcome is u = 0, the table states that the induced
belief is µ(r(p,0),y) = 0. This is because voters observe an outcome which cannot arise
from honest policy decision making and so they infer that the incumbent is of the bad
type. Similarly, if voters observe a beneﬁt outcome qh or qo, they infer that they face a
good type because there is no better outcome which could be realised, independently of
external information.
Table 1 does not specify the belief µ(r(n,ql),∅) for the following reason. Voters cannot
infer the type of the politician with certainty when the record observed consists of policy
12This reasoning is in line with the monotonicity assumption in Coate and Morris (1995). See also
footnote 5.
6n and beneﬁt ql. For in this case this information set can be reached from two diﬀerent
paths. Firstly, the politician might have been of type good that has chosen the new
policy, taken no transfers, but Nature drew the bad outcome ql, or secondly, she might
have been the bad type that has chosen the new policy and has taken transfers equivalent
to qh − ql, which amounts to producing the outcome ql.
The equilibria analysed in the following Section are distinguished by the value taken on by
this belief. Depending on whether voters are uninformed or not about what happened in
this situation, we have an equilibrium where the two types are undistinguishable (pooling
equilibrium) or distinguishable (separating equilibrium).
5 Analysis of equilibrium
Let (g,b) denote the equilibrium choice of the good and bad incumbent. Then, regarding
the policy choice only, the set of possible equilibria is {(n,n),(n,o),(o,o),(o,n)}. To
bring out the diﬀerent incentives of politicians to experiment, in what follows, we provide
a characterisation of this set of equilibria.
5.1 Pooling on new policy (n,n)
We start the analysis postulating an equilibrium in which both politicians choose the




p(n|i) = 1, i = g,b , (3)
σ
∗
τ(0|p,q,g) = 1, p = n,o, q = qh,qo,ql , (4)
σ
∗
τ(qh − ql|n,qh,b) = 1, (5)
σ
∗
τ(ql|n,ql,b) = 1, (6)
σ
∗
τ(qo|o,qo,b) = 1 . (7)
Brieﬂy, the equalities in (3) say that both types of politicians choose the new policy with
probability one. The other equalities describe the transfer choices. (4) says that the
good politician will take zero transfers with probability one. The remaining strategies
refer to the bad politician. In particular, following (5), if nature has drawn quality qh
then she takes transfers τ = qh − ql. In the case where nature has drawn ql she takes,
following (6), the maximal transfers. Finally, (7) says that if she chooses the old policy
then she also takes maximal transfers.
This equilibrium is supported by the beliefs of Table 1 and13
13The belief in (8) is derived by calculating the probabilities
Pr{g,r(n,ql),∅} = λσ∗
p(n|g)[θσ∗
τ(qh − ql|qh,g)(1 − π) + (1 − θ)σ∗
τ(0|ql,g)(1 − π)],
= λ(1 − θ)(1 − π), and
Pr{b,r(n,ql),∅} = (1 − λ)σ∗
p(n|b)[θσ∗
τ(qh − ql|qh,b)(1 − π) + (1 − θ)σ∗
τ(0|ql,b)(1 − π)],
= (1 − λ)(1 − π)θ,
7µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ . (8)
In this equilibrium when voters observe the outcome ql without any external information
they cannot perfectly infer the type of the incumbent. For this outcome may have
been generated by the good politician who drew the low quality outcome or by the bad
politician who realised the good outcome but appropriated transfers. Since priors are
the same for both types voters assess the probability of the incumbent being of good
type according to the probability of the low quality outcome.
We derive now, in a series of Lemmas,14 the optimal transfer policies and policy strategies,
conditional on the beliefs speciﬁed above, of the bad politician.
Lemma 1 With the quality of the new policy being qh the bad politician appropriates




(1 − θ)(1 − π)qh
. (9)
Lemma 2 With the quality of the new policy being ql the bad politician appropriates




[1 − θ(1 − π)]qo
. (10)
Recall from Section 3 that in the case in which the old policy has been chosen in the
ﬁrst period and therefore the politician has not experimented with the new policy what
matters, following (1), is her expectation regarding the quality of the new policy.
Lemma 3 With the old policy being chosen in the ﬁrst period the bad politician appro-




θπqh + (1 − θ)πqo + (1 − π)max{θqh + (1 − θ)ql;qo}
. (11)
Moving backwards we now verify that, given the optimal transfers, the policy strategies
in (3) are optimal.
Lemma 4 Anticipating the optimal transfer choices of Lemmas 1 to 3, the bad politician
chooses the new policy iﬀ
δ ≥ δb(θ,π)
def =
θ(2ql − qh) + (qo − ql)
θ(1 − π)(1 − θ)qh
. (12)
We now turn to the good politician. The incentives of this politician depend on how the
expected quality of the new policy compares to the quality of the old policy.
and inserting them into Bayes’ formula using λ = 1 − λ.
14All proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
8Lemma 5 If θ ≥ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) and if qh − ql > q0, the good politician chooses the
new rather than the old policy for all δ and π with 0 ≤ δ,π ≤ 1.
Lemma 6 If θ < (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) and qh ≥ 2qo, the good politician chooses the new
rather than the old policy iﬀ
δ ≥ δg(θ,π)
def =
θqh + (1 − θ)ql − qo
θ(1 − π)[qo(2 − θ) − qh]
. (13)
The focus of the analysis is on the incentives of the politicians to experiment with the
new policy. For this reason Lemma 6 is particularly interesting. After all the essence
of experimentation is to choose the new policy even though its expected quality falls
short of the quality of the well known policy. Therefore, we want to ensure that Lemma
6 is applicable. This is achieved by restricting attention to a policy innovation with
a technology that satisﬁes qh = 2qo.15 The added beneﬁt from doing so is that the
exposition is simpliﬁed by avoiding cumbersome case distinctions. Given this restriction
it seems natural to place a similar restriction on ql, qo. These two restrictions seem
perfectly reasonable. They simply imply that replacing the old by the new policy either
doubles the value of the policy or halves it that is, qh/qo = qo/ql = 2.
In the following proposition we characterise the space of parameters δ,θ, for various π,
for which a pooling equilibrium on the new policy exists. This characterisation makes
use of the Lemmas 1 to 6. These Lemmas give lower or upper bounds on the discount
factor δ for given θ and π. Now deﬁne the binding lower and upper bounds on δ as
δ(θ,π)
def = max{δg(θ,π),δb(θ,π),δh(θ,π)}, (14)
δ(θ,π)
def = min{δl(θ,π),δo(θ,π)} . (15)
Then we have
Proposition 1 There are functions θ(π),θ(π) such that
∀π ∈ [0,.4] : 0 < θ(π) ≤ θ(π) < 1 ,
∀π ∈ [0,.4] and ∀θ ∈ [θ(π),θ(π)] : 0 < δ(θ,π) ≤ δ(θ,π) < 1 .
Moreover, if π ∈ [0,.4], ∀θ ∈ [θ(π),θ(π)), and δ ∈ (δ(θ,π),δ(θ,π)], then an equilibrium
with the following properties exists:
(i) Both politicians choose to experiment with the new policy in the ﬁrst period.
(ii) The good politician always takes zero transfers, while the bad politician takes the
‘mimicking’ transfers τ∗(qh) = qh − ql when the quality of the new policy is high,
and the unrestricted transfers τ∗(ql) = ql and τ∗(qo) = qo when the quality of the
new policy is low and when the old policy is chosen, respectively.
(iii) Beliefs are as in Table 1 and (8).
15Without this restriction condition (13) would change sign for θ less than the ˜ θ solving qo(2−˜ θ)−qh =
0. This could not be satisﬁed for any positive δ. By imposing qh = 2qo we reduce ˜ θ to zero. By doing
so we make sure that the act of experimentation might take place even for values of θ close to zero.
9(iv) In the second period both politicians implement the new policy iﬀ its quality has
been high and choose the old policy iﬀ the quality of the new policy has been low.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1.

















The equilibrium exists if (θ,δ) is in the region (a,b,c,d,e).
For π = .4 this space shrinks to A.
To provide the intuition of Proposition 1 it is most instructive to start with the situation
without any external information that is, π = 0. Consider the good politician ﬁrst. She
faces three diﬀerent incentives, one referring to the ﬁrst period payoﬀs, the other two
referring to the second period payoﬀs. More speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst period she evaluates
the expected beneﬁt of the new policy relative to the beneﬁt of the old policy. Having
chosen the new policy in the ﬁrst period induces a cost and a beneﬁt in the second
period. The cost consists of the risk of being mimicked by the bad politician and voted
out of oﬃce. The beneﬁt comes from the information on the quality of the new policy
gathered by experimentation. Thus, the tradeoﬀ in the second period payoﬀs is between
the political risk of being mimicked and the risk of a mistake in policy choice.
For values of θ such that the expected beneﬁt of the new policy is less than the beneﬁt
of the old policy (θ < (qo −ql)/(qh −ql)) the ﬁrst period consideration is in favour of the
old policy. Second period considerations though are against choosing the old policy in
the ﬁrst period. For low θ the disutility of being mimicked is less than the cost of not
knowing the quality of the new policy in the second period. The reason for that is that
citizens do not penalise the occurrence of the low quality outcome ql very heavily, as is
10implied by the belief µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1−θ. Therefore the good politician is still reelected
with a high probability even if she was unlucky.
Since ﬁrst and second period considerations point towards diﬀerent directions, the rela-
tive weight of both periods is critical. It turns out then that if the future is suﬃciently
important, i.e., δ is high, then the net second period gain conferred by choosing the new
policy in the ﬁrst period outweighs the ﬁrst period cost.
For suﬃciently high θ the expected ﬁrst period beneﬁt of the new policy is higher than
the beneﬁt of the old policy. The balance of the second period considerations is in favour
of the old policy. For in this case the undeserved punishment, as implied again by the
belief µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ, of the good politician when the citizens cannot distinguish
her from the bad politician is severe relative to the beneﬁt of experimentation. However,
ﬁrst period considerations dominate for all admissible values of the discount factor δ.
We turn now to the bad politician. The ﬁrst period tradeoﬀ is similar to the tradeoﬀ
faced by the good politician. However, this type does not care about being uninformed
after having chosen the old policy in the ﬁrst period. This is because the risk of a mistake
in policy due to non-experimentation is not present for her. For in this case she takes
the unrestricted transfers, reveals herself and consequently she is voted out of oﬃce.
However, this politician too ﬁnds the new policy attractive. The reason simply being
that the new policy allows her, in the eventuality in which the high quality is realised,
to mimick the good politician. If this happens she is reelected with positive probability,
determined by the belief µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ, although she has appropriated rents.
Clearly then second period eﬀects are in favour of the new policy.
For suﬃciently high θ ﬁrst and second period payoﬀs are both in favour of choosing the
new policy in the ﬁrst. For suﬃciently low θ choosing the new policy in the ﬁrst period
is optimal if the second period advantage is highly valued relative to the ﬁrst period loss
that is, δ is high enough.
We describe now how the equilibrium changes as π increases above 0.
Proposition 2 An increase in π monotonically reduces the upper bound δ(θ,π) and
increases the lower bound δ(θ,π). This implies that as external information becomes
more available the space of parameters for which the pooling equilibrium of Proposition
1 exists decreases.
Proposition 2 reveals how the incentives of the two types of politicians change as more
information becomes available. Notice that ﬁrst period payoﬀs are unaﬀected by the
presence of external information. In the second period the incentives identiﬁed above
are less marked as π increases. This is because, after choosing the old policy, the good
politician enjoys the opportunity to free ride on the information externality and hence is
less interested in experimentation. Since also voters beneﬁt from the same information
externality, they detect the mimicking behaviour more often. For the good politician
this implies that the cost of being mimicked decreases with π. Naturally, this makes the
new policy also more attractive. Although both policies become more attractive, relative
to the new, the old policy becomes still more desirable. For the equilibrium to still exist
after an increase in π, a higher discount factor δ is needed. For the bad politician the
11payoﬀ of the mimicking option is reduced. Hence this type of politician is less inclined to
choose the new policy, and also for her, a higher discount factor δ is needed to support
the equilibrium.
Clearly then, Proposition 2 reveals two interesting but conﬂicting features of the politico-
economic environment. On the one hand relative performance evaluation (by means of
the information parameter) is desirable because the bad type (increasingly) reveals herself
but on the other hand it is bad because the good type experiments with the new policy
less frequently by free riding on the information externalities.
In Figure 1, the arrows indicate the comparative statics of changes in π on the space of
parameters supporting the equilibrium. This space shrinks monotonically to point A at
which π = .4. Further increases in external information destroy the equilibrium.
5.2 Separating on policy (n,o)
In this Section an equilibrium is constructed with the following features. Firstly, the
good type chooses the new policy whereas the bad sticks to the old one. Secondly, the
bad politician takes unrestricted transfer in all circumstances. Formally, the strategies
in the ﬁrst period are
σ
∗
p(n|g) = 1 , (16)
σ
∗
p(o|b) = 1 , (17)
σ
∗
τ(0|p,qi,g) = 1 , for all p = o,n, i = h,o,l , (18)
σ
∗
τ(qi|p,qi,b) = 1 , for all p = o,n, i = h,o,l . (19)
The beliefs are summarised in Table 1. Compared to the (n,n) equilibrium only the
beliefs related to the record r(n,ql) with y = ∅ changes. For this equilibrium we postu-
late,16
µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1. (20)
We ﬁrst verify the optimality of the transfer choices. In analogy to Lemma 1, if the








(21) diﬀers from inequality (9) of Lemma 1 by the factor (1−θ) reﬂecting the fact that in
the present equilibrium mimicking would lead to a sure reelection whereas in the pooling
16It is straightforward to see that this belief is generated by the equilibrium strategies. Recall
Pr{g,r(n,ql),∅} from footnote (8). Then compute
Pr{b,r(n,ql),∅} = (1 − λ)σ∗
p(n|b)[θσ∗
τ(qh − ql|qh,b)(1 − π) + (1 − θ)σ∗
τ(0|ql,b)(1 − π)] = 0 .
Inserting this and Pr{g,r(n,ql),∅} into Bayes’ rule yields µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1.
12equilibrium (n,n) the reelection probability is only 1 − θ. Consider now the transfer
choice τ∗(ql) = ql of the bad politician after the new policy was chosen and a low beneﬁt








This value diﬀers from (10) since in this equilibrium there is no risk of being voted out
of oﬃce. Finally, Lemma 3 remains the same in this equilibrium.
Turning to the policy choice of the bad politician we note that since she always takes
maximal transfers she is always voted out of oﬃce. Hence only the ﬁrst period payoﬀs





The good politician is always reelected with probability 1. By analogy to Lemmas 5
and 6, the good politician chooses the new policy iﬀ θ ≥ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) or θ <





qo − [θqh + (1 − θ)ql]
θ(1 − π)(qh − qo)
. (24)
This bound on δ diﬀers from the bound on δ in Lemma 6 because in the present equi-
librium there is no risk of being mimicked. This makes the new policy more attractive










h (π) if π ≤ (qh − q0)/qh ,
δ
n,o
l if π > (qh − q0)/qh .
(25)
As in Proposition 1 these function give the lower and upper bounds on the discount
factor δ such that for given θ and π the separating equilibrium (n,o) exists. We so have
Proposition 3 There is a function θ
n,o(π), satisfying
∀π ∈ [0,1] : 0 < θ
n,o(π) ≤ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql),
∀π ∈ [0,1] and θ ∈ [θ




Moreover, if π ∈ [0,1], θ ∈ [θ




an equilibrium with the following properties exists:
(i) The good politician experiments with the new policy in the ﬁrst period, while the
bad politician chooses the old policy in the ﬁrst period.
(ii) The good politician never takes transfers, while the bad politician takes the unre-
stricted transfers in each instance.
(iii) Beliefs are as in Table 1 and (20).


















The equilibrium exists if (θ,δ) is in the region (a,b,c).
(iv) In the second period the good politician implements the experimented policy if its
quality has been high and switches to the old policy if its quality has been low. The
bad politician is voted out.
Figure 2 illustrates the Proposition.
This equilibrium exists for low values of the discount factor. This implies that the incen-
tive of the bad politician to mimick is reduced, as compared to the pooling equilibrium
(n,n), inducing her to take maximal transfers. Since she is voted out in all eventualities
what matters to her is ﬁrst period payoﬀs. For low values of θ < (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) the
old policy is preferable. The good politician is never mimicked and so the cost associated
with the new policy in the pooling equilibrium (n,n) is absent. This makes her more
willing to experiment with the new policy.
Proposition 3 shows that it is possible to have two attractive features of the political
system at the same time. Firstly, political competition works well enough inducing the
bad politician to reveal her type instead of mimicking the good type. Secondly, the
good politician has suﬃcient incentives to experiment with the new policy. For her, it is
worthwhile to learn its quality by trying out the new policy rather than free riding on
the information gathered elsewhere.
To investigate the eﬀect of external information on these two features of the economic
environment, we now perform comparative statics with respect to π on the space for
which this separating equilibrium exists. In doing so we arrive at
14Proposition 4 For θ < (qo − ql)(qh − ql) an increase in π strictly increases the lower
bound δ
n,o(θ,π) required for the equilibrium (n,o). It also strictly increases the upper
bound δ
n,o
(π) iﬀ π < (qh − q0)/qh.
On the one hand, the information externality makes the good politician less willing to
experiment. On this score the space of parameters supporting the equilibrium shrinks.
On the other hand, a higher π makes the mimicking option for the bad politician less
attractive since she is detected more often. Thus, she will choose the unrestricted trans-
fers for even higher values of the discount factor. On that score the space of parameters
increases. Comparative statics are indicated by the arrows in Figure 2.
5.3 A ‘pooling’ equilibrium on old policy (o,o)
We turn now to the equilibrium in which both politicians choose the old policy. The
transfer choices are as in the pooling equilibrium on new policy (n,n). Formally the
strategies of the politicians are given by σ∗
p(o|i) = 1,i = g,b and (4) to (7). This
equilibrium is supported by the same beliefs as the (n,n) equilibrium.17
Since transfer choices and beliefs are the same as in the (n,n) equilibrium the δ functions
supporting that equilibrium deﬁne also the space of parameters for which the (o,o)
equilibrium exists. Speciﬁcally, Lemmas 1 to 3 continue to hold. Since policy choices
are opposite to the (n,n) equilibrium the inequality referring to the bad politician given
in Lemma 4 reverses sign. For the good type we note from Lemma 5 that only for
θ < (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) she will choose the old policy. She will do so iﬀ the inequality in
Lemma 6 reverses sign.
The space of parameters δ,θ, for various π, for which a pooling equilibrium on the old
policy exists is deﬁned by the following lower and upper bounds
δ
o,o(θ,π)




def = min{δl(θ,π),δb(θ,π),δg(θ,π)} . (27)
Proposition 518 There exists a function θ
o,o
(π) such that:
∀π ∈ [0,.5] : 0 ≤ θ
o,o
(π) < (qo − ql)/(qh − ql),
∀π ∈ [0,.5] and θ ∈ [0,θ
o,o




Moreover if π ∈ [0,.5),∀θ ∈ (0,θ
o,o
(π)) and δ ∈ (δ
o,o(θ,π),δ
o,o
(θ,π)) then an equilibrium
with the following properties exists:
17A word of clariﬁcation is in order here. Belief µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ as well as all beliefs relating to
the new policy are now out-of-equilibrium beliefs. According to the intuitive reasoning leading to the
beliefs of Table 1 voters when forming their beliefs place more emphasis on what they know about the
transfers appropriated rather than on the policy choice. This means that in the present equilibrium if
voters observe the out-of-equilibrium policy choice n they should form the beliefs considering only the
transfer choice. This is because voters perceive both types of politicians as being equally likely to make
a policy mistake but very unlikely to make a mistake in transfers. Therefore if voters observe ql without
external information they should assign the same belief as in the (n,n) equilibrium.
18The proofs of Propositions 5 and 7 parallel closely the proof of Proposition 1 and are omitted to
save space. The proofs are available from the authors upon request.
15(i) Both types of politicians do not experiment but choose the old policy.
(ii) The good politician never takes transfers while the bad takes the transfers of Propo-
sition 1.
(iii) Beliefs are as in Table 1 and (8).
(iv) In the second period the good type is voted in. She chooses the new policy with
probability θπ and with probability (1 − θπ) she chooses the old policy. The bad
politician is voted out.
Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 3.

















The equilibrium exists if (θ,δ) is in the region (a,B,c,d,e).
For π = .5 this space shrinks to B.
In this seemingly pooling equilibrium there is no experimentation but both politicians
choose the old policy. The characterisation ‘seemingly’ stems from the fact that the
existence of transfers, after the choice of the old policy by both types, allows voters to
infer the type of politicians in equilibrium and so vote out of oﬃce the bad incumbent.
Naturally, this equilibrium occurs if θ is low so the new policy is very unlikely to be of
high quality and if δ is low so the second period advantage of the new policy is discounted
heavily.
We turn now to the comparative statics of π on the parameter space for which this
equilibrium exists.
16Proposition 6 An increase in the revelation probability π strictly increases the lower
bound δ
o,o(θ,π) required for the (o,o) equilibrium. For π >
√
6/6 the upper bound δ
o,o
(π)
is decreasing in π and therefore the parameter space decreases monotonically.
The intuition for this Proposition is similar to the intuition oﬀered in Proposition 2.
This is simply because the bounds δh, δl are the same as in the (n,n) equilibrium.
The only distinction between both equilibria is that here these bounds apply to the
optimal continuation of the game after the oﬀ-the-equilibrium choice of the new policy
has occurred. The arrows in Figure 3 indicate the comparative statics.
5.4 Separating on policy choices (o,n)
In this Section we construct an equilibrium in which the bad politician chooses the new
policy and takes unrestricted transfers in all eventualities whereas the good politician
chooses the old policy and never takes transfers. Formally the strategies of the politicians
are as in the separating equilibrium (n,o) with the exception of σ∗
p(o|g) = 1, σ∗
p(n|b) =
1. The interesting belief is the one related to low quality outcome without external
information. In this equilibrium this is19
µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 0 . (28)
This belief implies that the bad politician faces certain defeat in the election when the
outcome ql occurs. She has, therefore, no incentive to take the mimicking transfers qh−ql
after the high quality was realised. It thus follows that τ∗(qh) = qh is the optimal choice.









This is because of the belief in (28) which implies that when she takes no transfers she
is only reelected if there is external information. Lemma 3 is unaﬀected by the present
belief and so remains valid.
For the policy choices we note the following. The bad politician is always voted out and
hence she only considers ﬁrst period payoﬀs. Therefore she chooses the new policy iﬀ
θ ≥ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql). The good politician, if she chooses the new policy, is voted in
in all instances except when ql occurs and there is no external information. This leads
to the payoﬀ θ(qh − ql) + ql + δ[θqh + (1 − θ)πqo]. If now she opts for the old policy she
obtains, with θ > (qo −ql)/(qh −ql), qo +δ{θqh +(1−θ)[πqo +(1−π)ql]}. A comparison





θ(qh − ql) − (qo − ql)
(1 − θ)(1 − π)ql
. (30)
19The use of the belief µ(r(n,ql),∅) of the (n,n) and (n,o) equilibria would imply that the good
politician faces the same incentives as in these equilibria. Therefore the good type would never choose
the old policy for θ ≥ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql). The bad type, however, chooses the new policy in the
equilibrium o,n only if the latter inequality is satisﬁed.
17The next Proposition gives the space of parameters for which the (o,n) equilibrium











l (π),δo(θ,π)} . (32)
Then we have
Proposition 7 There is a function θ
o,n
(π) such that
∀π ∈ [0,1) : (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) < θ
o,n
(π) < 1 ,
∀π ∈ [0,1) and ∀θ ∈ [(qo − ql)/(qh − ql),θ
o,n
(π)] : 0 < δ
o,n(θ,π) ≤ δ
o,n
(θ,π) < 1 .
Moreover, if π ∈ [0,1), ∀θ ∈ [(qo − ql)/(qh − ql),θ
o,n




then an equilibrium with the following properties exists:
(i) The good politician chooses the old policy whereas the bad experiments with the new
policy.
(ii) The good politician never takes transfers while the bad takes the maximal transfers.
(iii) All beliefs are as in Table 1 and (28).
(iv) In the second period the good politician is voted in and chooses the new policy unless
it has been shown to be of low quality. The bad politician is voted out.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 7.
In this equilibrium experimentation takes place by the bad politician who reveals herself
by taking maximal transfers. The good politician, given that the bad plays the new
policy, responds by playing the old and getting reelected in the second period. She
refrains from experimenting even for relatively high values of θ because in doing so she
would be voted out if the low outcome occurs without external information.
As π increases and the low outcome occurs the good politician is reelected more often.
This makes the new policy more attractive. For her to continue choosing the old policy
she needs to place a higher weight on the second period payoﬀs. For the bad politician
higher π makes zero transfers more attractive. For her to continue choosing maximal
transfers future must be discounted more heavily. We so have20
Proposition 8 An increase in π increases the lower bound δ
o,n(θ,π) and decreases the
upper bound δ
o,n
(θ,π). The space of parameters for which the equilibrium (o,n) exists
therefore decreases.
20The proof straightforwardly follows from diﬀerentiating δ
o,n
l (π), δo(θ,π), δo,n
g (θ,π).













The equilibrium exists if (θ,δ) is in the region (a,b,c).
6 Welfare analysis
Having analysed the four equilibria we now turn to voters’ welfare. This necessitates
to consider two issues. Firstly, whether the availability of more external information
improves voters’ welfare within each of the equilibria analysed. Secondly, whether an
increase in information is beneﬁcial for voters if it induces a change in the equilibrium.
A pairwise comparison of all equilibria, though feasible, would be quite tedious and
probably not very interesting. For this reason, we restrict attention to a comparison
between the (n,n) and the (n,o) equilibria. As it has been discussed the (n,n) equilib-
rium combines the attractive feature of experimentation with the drawback of mimicking
behaviour which makes the political system perform poorly. In the (n,o) equilibrium
on the other hand democracy works perfectly but at the cost of reducing innovation.
Consequently, the comparison of these two equilibria reveals whether it is worthwhile for
the voters to trade oﬀ some innovation for detecting the types of the politicians.
6.1 Welfare analysis for a given type of equilibrium
Having more external information produces two externalities. The ﬁrst one refers to the
politicians whereas the other concerns the voters. Both types of politicians more often
make informed policy choices in the second period after the old policy was chosen in
the ﬁrst period. Whenever the second period politician is of the good type, this also
enhances voters’ welfare while it does not hurt them if the bad politician is in oﬃce
in the second period. Voters are better informed about the type of the incumbent and
19therefore vote out the bad type more often and the good type less often. This ﬁnding
highlights an important aspect of the politico-economic environment. In general, the
availability of more external information improves on the ineﬃciencies of the democratic
process. All these eﬀects are beneﬁcial to voters as is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Consider (θ,δ,π) such that the same equilibrium exists before and after
a small increase in π. In this equilibrium, an increase in π strictly improves citizens’
welfare.
6.2 Welfare analysis with a change in the type of equilibrium
We now consider a change in π such that the equilibrium switches from (n,n) to (n,o).
For this to be meaningful we hold all parameters but π constant and restrict attention
to such values of (θ,δ) with the property that as π changes both equilibria exist. Propo-
sitions 1 and 3 indicate that such (θ,δ) exist.21 Moreover, there is no π such that for this
π and for given (θ,δ) both equilibria co-exist.22 Finally, Proposition 2 shows that if for
given (θ,δ) the (n,n) equilibrium exists for any π, then it also exists for π = 0. Together
with the preceding remark, this implies that an increase in π can produce a switch from
the (n,n) equilibrium to the (n,o) equilibrium but not the other way round. Then we
have
Proposition 10 Consider (θ,δ) and π1 < π2 such that there exists an (n,n) equilibrium
for (θ,δ,π1) and an (n,o) equilibrium for (θ,δ,π2). Then citizens are at least as well oﬀ
in the (n,n) equilibrium and strictly better oﬀ if π1 > 0 or π2 < 1.
This result shows that increased information ceases to be unambiguously better for the
citizens once a change of behaviour by the politicians occurs. If there is little external
information the bad politician mimicks the good one by choosing the new policy and
appropriating less than maximal rents. This leaves citizens with some ﬁrst period utility.
In addition, the bad politician produces information on the quality of the new policy
which will be helpful next period if a good challenger is in oﬃce then. On the other hand
the political system sometimes fails by evicting a good or retaining a bad incumbent.
Improving external information makes the mimicking strategy unattractive for the bad
type. Now the election works perfectly but at the cost of higher rent extraction and less
experimentation. Overall these two kinds of cost dominate the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the
improved performance of the political system.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have constructed a simple dynamic model that investigated the conﬂict-
ing interaction between political uncertainty and the incentives to experiment with new
policies. Selﬁsh politicians can disguise their behaviour behind the policy uncertainty
intrinsic in innovative programmes by mimicking a benevolent politician. The reason is
21An example is θ close to but slightly below than 1/3 and δ slightly above 3/8. Here, for π = 0, the
(n,n) equilibrium exists while the (n,o) equilibrium does not. For π > 1/3 the reverse is true.
22This can be seen, for instance, from observing that the (n,n) equilibrium exists only if δ >
δh(1/3,π) = 3/8(1 − π), while the (n,o) equilibrium exists only if δ ≤ δ
n,o
h (π) = 1/4(1 − π).
20that, when faced with a bad outcome of a policy experiment, citizens may be unable to
distinguish between an honest politician who just happened to be unlucky and a self-
ish politician who diverted part of the return of the successful innovation to herself. It
was shown that this behaviour occurs less often if there is external information which,
however, at the same time creates an externality that reduces the incentives to innovate.
It was also shown that external information improves welfare as long as the behaviour of
the politicians is unaﬀected. However, if external information changes the equilibrium,
from one where both types of politicians innovate to one where only the benevolent
politician does so, voters’ welfare decreases. The reason being that the selﬁsh politician
is detected more often and consequently behaves more aggressively appropriating more
rents. This and the cost incurred by voters due to reduced experimentation dominate
the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the improved performance of the political system.
The paper suggests a number of extensions. A natural step forward would be to endo-
genise the availability of external information. In the ﬁscal federalism setting that would
require modelling several competing jurisdictions and analysing the game between the
incumbents of these jurisdictions. This will allow to study the impact of a more de-
centralised system on the availability of information and consequently on the extent
of innovation and the working of the political system throughout the federation. An-
other road to follow will be to incorporate career prospects of politicians and investigate




Proof of Lemma 1 Recall, that in the case of qh the strategies available to the bad
politician are τ ∈ {qh,qh−ql,0}. Firstly, consider τ = qh. In this case, according to belief
µ(r(n,0),y) = 0 for y = qh,∅, she is voted out with ﬁrst period utility qh. Secondly, she
can take τ = qh−ql and generate the outcome ql. In this case the bad type, according to
µ(r(n,ql),qh) = 0, is voted out if there is external information and is reelected, according
to µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ, with probability 1 − θ when there is no external information.
In the second period she chooses unrestricted transfers qh with second period payoﬀ
δ(1 − π)(1 − θ)qh. Altogether τ = qh − ql yields qh − ql + δ(1 − π)(1 − θ)qh . Thirdly,
she can take no transfers and receive utility zero in the ﬁrst period. In doing so, she
generates an outcome qh implying a reelection with certainty through µ(r(n,qh),y) = 1
for y = qh,∅. Once in oﬃce the bad politician chooses τ = qh which confers utility qh.
In total, utility after τ = 0 is 0 + δqh. Comparison of the payoﬀs under the alternative
transfer strategies, following on δ < 1, implies that τ = qh is preferable to τ = 0 and
τ = qh − ql is preferable to τ = qh iﬀ the condition in Lemma 1 is satisﬁed.  
Proof of Lemma 2 Recall that with quality ql the bad politician takes τ ∈ {ql,0}.
τ = ql, according to µ(r(n,0),y) = 0, implies no reelection and therefore utility ql.
With τ = 0 the bad type behaves exactly as the good (receiving zero utility in the ﬁrst
period) reaping the beneﬁt of reelection with probability one in the case of external
information, according to µ(r(n,ql),ql) = 1, and with probability 1 − θ, according to
µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ, in the case of no external information. In the second period she
chooses τ = qo with total second period discounted utility δ{π + (1 − π)(1 − θ)}qo. It
then follows that for the bad politician to choose the unrestricted transfers (10) must be
satisﬁed.  
Proof of Lemma 3 Recall that the transfer strategies available to the bad type are
τ ∈ {qo,0}. If this politician chooses τ = qo then—following µ(r(o,0),y) = 0 —she is
voted out obtaining zero second period discounted utility. The ﬁrst period utility is qo.
If she now chooses τ = 0 then she behaves like the good politician and, according to
µ(r(o,qo),y) = 1, is voted in with expected second period discounted utility given by
(1). It so follows that for this politician to choose τ∗(qo) = qo condition (11) must be
satisﬁed.  
Proof of Lemma 4 Consider the choice of the new policy by the bad politician in the
ﬁrst period, given the equilibrium transfer strategies of Lemmas 1-3. When choosing the
new policy, with probability θ the quality is high giving her transfers τ = qh − ql that
confer ﬁrst period utility qh − ql. There is also probability 1 − θ that the policy is of
low quality giving utility (from unrestricted transfers τ = ql) ql. It is clear then that
the expected ﬁrst period payoﬀ is θ(qh − 2ql) + ql. If the quality is low she is voted out
while if the quality is high she is reelected with probability (1 − π)(1 − θ) and obtains
qh in the second period. Therefore, the expected utility after choosing the new policy is
ql +θ(qh −2ql)+δθ(1−π)(1−θ)qh . The old policy on the other hand provides a payoﬀ
of qo in the ﬁrst period and no chance of reelection. Condition (12) then follows.  
22Proof of Lemma 5 The good politician, having experimented with the new policy, is
reelected with certainty if the policy turned out to be of high quality. This gives her
expected discounted second period utility θδqh. If now the realisation of the quality is
low, then the availability of external information matters. With probability π she is
reelected according to µ(r(n,ql),ql) = 1. With probability 1 − π she is reelected only
with probability 1 − θ according to µ(r(n,ql),∅) = 1 − θ. If reelected, in the second
period she returns to the old policy with payoﬀ qo. Altogether, the discounted expected
second period payoﬀ from the new policy is δ{θqh + (1 − θ)[π + (1 − π)(1 − θ)]qo}.
If the good politician now chooses the old policy in the ﬁrst period she is reelected with
certainty. From (1) it follows that if θ ≥ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) she obtains a discounted
expected payoﬀ δ{θqh + (1 − θ)[πqo + (1 − π)ql]}. Subtracting now the second period
beneﬁt of the new policy from the second period beneﬁt of the old policy and simplifying
yields δ(1 − θ)(1 − π){ql − (1 − θ)qo}. The new policy is preferable if its ﬁrst period
advantage θqh + (1 − θ)ql − qo outweighs the second period advantage of the old policy,
that is
θqh + (1 − θ)ql − qo ≥ δ(1 − θ)(1 − π){ql − (1 − θ)qo} . (A.1)
For θ ≥ (qo − ql)/(qh − ql), the l.h.s. of (A.1) is non-negative. Thus, if the r.h.s. is
non-positive, the Lemma is true. Consider therefore the case where ql − (1 − θ)qo > 0.
Since, by assumption, θ(qh − ql) > θq0 we have
θqh + (1 − θ)ql − qo = θ(qh − ql) + ql − qo ,
> θqo + ql − qo , (A.2)
= ql − (1 − θ)qo .
With ql−(1−θ)qo > 0, the last expression is greater than δ(1−θ)(1−π){ql−(1−θ)qo}.
 
Proof of Lemma 6 The proof proceeds exactly as the derivation of (A.1) but with the
second period payoﬀ after the old policy is chosen being replaced by δ[θπqh+(1−θπ)qo]
and using qh ≥ 2qo when solving for δ.  
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds in ﬁve steps. After some preliminaries in step 1, the functions δ and δ
are characterised in step 2. In step 3, the functions θ and θ are deﬁned and characterised.
In step 4, the inequalities claimed in the Proposition are veriﬁed. With that in place,
it will be easily shown in step 5 that the mentioned strategies are optimal, given that
(θ,δ,π) satisfy the constraints stated in the proposition.
Step 1: Preliminaries. In the course of the proof, we make various use of the values
of θ which, for any given π, yield pairwise equalities of the critical values δb,δg,δh,δl and
δo. Using qh/qo = qo/ql = 2 in the right-hand-sides of (9) to (13) and routinely solving












16 : δb(θ,π) = δg(θ,π), with θ < 1/2,
θb,h = 1
3 : δb(θ,π) = δh(θ,π),
θl,o(π) = 3−π
7−5π : δl(θ,π) = δo(θ,π),
θh,o(π) = 7−9π
11−9π : δh(θ,π) = δo(θ,π),
θl,h(π) = 1−2π
1−π : δl(θ,π) = δh(θ,π) .
(B.1)










[1 − θ(1 − π)]2qo








{θqh+(1−θ)[πqo+(1−π)ql]}2 < 0 , iﬀ θ > (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) ,
−πqo(qh−qo)





(1 − π)qh[θ2(2ql − qh) − (qo − ql)(1 − 2θ)]




[qo(2 − θ) − qh](qo − ql) + θqo[θqh + (1 − θ)ql − qo]
(1 − π){θ[qo(2 − θ) − qh]}
2 < 0 . (B.6)
Step 2: Characterisation of δ(θ,π) and δ(θ,π).
Lemma 7 For any given π,
δ(θ,π) =

   
   
δg(θ,π) for 0 < θ ≤ θb,g ,
δb(θ,π) for θb,g < θ ≤ θb,h ,
δh(θ,π) for θb,h < θ < 1 .
(B.7)
Proof of Lemma 7 We ﬁrst compare δb and δh. Recall that θ = θb,h uniquely solves
δb(θ,π) = δh(θ,π). Moreover, from (B.2) and (B.5), ∂δh/∂θ > 0 and ∂δb/∂θ < 0. Hence
the function δh(θb,h,π) cuts the function δb(θb,h,π) from below at θb,h(π). It then follows
δb(θ,π) ⋚ δh(θ,π) if θ   θb,h . (B.8)
24Next consider δb and δg for θ < θb,h. Again, θ = θb,g is the only root of δb(θ,π) = δg(θ,π).






−2θ2 + 2θ − 1





4(1 − π)θ3 . (B.9)
Hence, we conclude
δb(θ,π)   δg(θ,π) if θ   θb,g . (B.10)
To summarise we note that for 0 < θ ≤ θb,g it holds that δg(θ,π) ≥ δb(θ,π) > δh(θ,π).
For θb,g < θ ≤ θb,h, one has δb(θ,π) > δg(θ,π) and δb(θ,π) ≥ δh(θ,π). Finally, for
θ > θb,h, it holds δh(θ,π) > δb(θ,π) > δg(θ,π). These inequalities prove the Lemma.  





δl(θ,π) for θ ≤ θl,o(π) ,
δo(θ,π) for θl,o(π) < θ .
(B.11)
Proof of Lemma 8 From (B.1) we have that δl(θ,π) = δo(θ,π) is uniquely solved by
θ = θl,o(π). Since, from (B.3) and (B.4), δl(θ,π) and δo(θ,π) are, respectively, increasing
and decreasing functions of θ, we have
δl(θ,π)   δo(θ,π) if θ   θl,o(π) . (B.12)
Lemma (8) then readily follows.  
Step 3: Construction of θ(π) and θ(π). For any π consider the equality
δ(θ,π) = δ(θ,π) with θ ≤ θb,h . (B.13)
Given that, for θ < θb,h, δ(θ,π) and δ(θ,π) are decreasing and increasing in θ, re-
spectively, there can be at most one such θ satisfying (B.13). For θ close to zero we
have δ(0,π) = δg(0,π) → ∞, and δ(0,π) = δl(0,π) = 1/2. Hence δ(θ,π) > δ(θ,π)
for θ close to zero. At θ = θb,h = 1/3 we ﬁnd that δ(1/3,π) = 3/[8(1 − π)] and
δ(1/3,π) = 3/[2(2 + π)]. It then follows that δ(1/3,π) < δ(1/3,π) for π < .4. Hence for
0 ≦ π < .4, by continuity, there exists a θ solving (B.13). Denote this by θ(π). It then
follows from θl,o(π) > θb,h, (B.7), (B.11) and the slopes of δg,δl that
θ(π) = max{θg,l(π),θb,l(π)} . (B.14)
Similarly consider, for any π, the set of θ such that,
δ(θ,π) = δ(θ,π) and θ > θb,h . (B.15)
As shown, at θ = θb,h = 1/3, it holds δ(1/3,π) < δ(1/3,π) if π < .4. For θ → 1, we
obtain δ(θ,π) = δh(θ,π) = 1/4(1−π)(1−θ) → ∞. Also δ(1,π) = δo(1,π) = 1/2. Hence
an intersection exists. From the construction of δ(θ,π) and δ(θ,π) this is uniquely given
by
θ(π) = min{θl,h(π),θh,o(π)} . (B.16)
25Step 4: The inequalities 0 < θ(π) ≤ θ(π) < 1 and 0 < δ(θ,π) ≤ δ(π,θ) < 1. Notice
that θ(π) < θb,h < θ(π). From θ(π) = max{θl,g(π),θl,b(π)} one veriﬁes that, for all π,
θ(π) > 0. From θ(π) = min{θh,o(π),θl,o(π)} one also concludes that θ(π) < 1.
At θ = θb,h = 1/3, for all π ∈ [0,.4), δ(1/3,π) < δ(1/3,π). Moreover, since for θ <
θb,h = 1/3 there is no other θ but θ(π) such that δ(θ,π) = δ(θ,π), it is true, for all
θ(π) < θ < θb,h, that δ(θ,π) < δ(θ,π). By similar reasoning this is also true for
θb,h < θ < θ(π). For any given π, from (B.7) and the slopes of δb,δg, and δh, δ(θ,π) is
minimal for θ = θb,h = 1/3. From δ(1/3,π) = δh(1/3,π), it is obvious that δ(1/3,π) > 0.
Similarly the maximum of δ(θ,π) is reached at θ = θl,o(π). It can be easily veriﬁed that
δ(θl,o,π) < 1.
Step 5: Optimality of the strategies. Note that δ(θ,π) and δ(θ,π) are constructed
so as to reﬂect the binding lower and upper bounds on δ required for the optimality
conditions as stated in Lemmas 1 to 5. Hence, any triple (θ,π,δ) with 0 ≦ π ≦ .4,
θ(π) ≤ θ < θ(π) and δ(θ,π) < δ ≤ δ(θ,π) satisﬁes all conditions for an equilibrium.  
Proof of Proposition 2






θ(1 − π)2[qo(2 − θ) − qh]




θ(1 − θ)qh[θ(2ql − qh) + (qo − ql)]
[θ(1 − π)(1 − θ)qh]2 > 0 , (B.18)





qh(1 − π)2(1 − θ)





[1 − θ(1 − π)]2qo








{θqh+(1−θ)[πqo+(1−π)ql]}2 < 0 , iﬀ θ > (qo − ql)/(qh − ql) ,
−θqo(qh−qo)




Proof of Proposition 3
Observe that limθ→0 δn,o
g (θ,π) = +∞. For θ = (q0 −ql)/(qh −ql), we have δn,o






(1 − π)(qh − q0)(q0 − ql)
[θ(1 − π)(qh − q0)]2 < 0 . (C.1)
Since δ
n,o
is constant in θ, for each π, there is a unique θ




(π) with 0 < θ





n,o(π) < θ < (q0−ql)/(qh−ql). Finally, in this range of θ, δ




In the text it is shown that the claimed strategies are optimal given the beliefs if (11) and
(21) to (24) are satisﬁed simultaneously. To see that this is the case, note ﬁrst that the
denominator of the r.h.s. of (11) cannot exceed qh. Hence (11) is satisﬁed if δ ≤ q0/qh.
Using the assumption ql/q0 = q0/qh, one concludes that (11) is always true if (22) holds.
Moreover, comparing (21) and (22), one ﬁnds that (21) implies (22) for πh ≤ (qh−q0)/qh
and vice versa for πh > (qh − q0)/qh. The inequality δ ≤ δ
n,o
(π) postulates that the
stricter one of these requirements is true. Hence δ ≤ δ
n,o
(π) implies (11), (22) and (21).
Turning to the policy choices, one notices that (24) is satisﬁed for δ ≥ δ
n,o(θ,π). Finally,
the inequality (23) for the policy choice by the bad policy maker is clearly satisﬁed for
the range of θ given.  





θ(qh − q0){q0 − [θqh + (1 − θ)ql]}
[θ(1 − π)(qh − q0)]2 > 0 , (C.2)
with the inequality following from θ < (q0 − ql)/(qh − ql). The upper bound, given by
(25), is increasing in π iﬀ π < (qh − q0)/qh.  
Proof of Proposition 6 The lower bound was shown to be decreasing in π in (B.19).
Following the line of argument presented in the proof of Proposition 1 one can verify that
for π >
√
6/6 and θ < θ
o,o
(π) the upper bound δ
o,o
(θ,π) = δl(θ,π). This is decreasing,
following on (B.20), in π.  
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 9 In the (n,n) equilibrium, we note the following. The good
type behaves according to the wishes of the electorate. This gives, depending on the
realisation of the new policy’s quality, ﬁrst period utility of qh or ql to voters. Also, if in
the second period a good politician is in oﬃce citizens enjoy utility of qh or qo. A bad
second period government on the other hand will take unlimited transfers implying zero
second period utility for the electorate. The good incumbent is reelected with certainty
if either qh is realised or ql has occurred and external information is available. She is
reelected with probability 1 − θ if ql has occurred and there is no external information.
With the remaining probability θ the challenger is elected who has expected reputation
EG(λc) = λ. Altogether, after the outcome ql the probability of having a good second
period politician is π + (1 − π)(1 − θ + θλ). Denoting by EUnn(i;θ,δ,π) the expected
utility of voters along the (n,n) equilibrium path when the type of the incumbent is
i = b,g, this implies
EU
nn(g;θ,δ,π) = θ(1 + δ)qh + (1 − θ){ql + δ[π + (1 − π)(1 − θ + θλ)]qo} . (D.1)
Similarly, we ﬁnd
EU
nn(b;θ,δ,π) = θql + δλ{θ[π + (1 − π)θ]qh) + (1 − θ)qo} . (D.2)
27By analogous reasoning the expected utility of voters in the other three equilibria can
be derived yielding
EU
no(g;θ,δ,π) = θ(1 + δ)qh + (1 − θ)(ql + δqo) , (D.3)
EU
no(b;θ,δ,π) = δλ[θπqh + (1 − θπ)qo] , (D.4)
EU
oo(g;θ,δ,π) = qo + δ[θπqh + (1 − θπ)qo] , (D.5)
EU
oo(b;θ,δ,π) = δλ[θπqh + (1 − θπ)qo] , (D.6)
EU
on(g;θ,δ,π) = qo + δ{θqh + (1 − θ)[πqo + (1 − π)ql]} , (D.7)
EU
on(b;θ,δ,π) = δλ[θqh + (1 − θ)qo] . (D.8)
In all four equilibria, at least one of the equations is strictly increasing in π while none is
decreasing. Therefore, ex ante expected welfare is strictly increasing in π. Finally, from
Propositions 1, 3, 5 and 7 one can verify that for each equilibrium there exists a triplet
of parameters (θ,δ,π) such that the equilibrium exists before and after a small change
in π.  
Proof of Proposition 10 Using (D.1) to (D.4) the change in ex ante welfare induced
by an increase from π1 to π2 is
λ[EU
nn(g;θ,δ,π1) − EU




Since from Proposition 9 welfare is increasing in π as long as the type of equilibrium




no(g;θ,δ,π2)] + (1 − λ)[EU
nn(b;θ,δ,0) − EU
no(b;θ,δ,π2)]




[1 + δ(3θ − 2 − π2)] , (D.10)
where the last equality follows from λ = 1/2 and qh/qo = qo/ql = 2. From (23) the (n,o)
equilibrium exists only if θ < 1/3 implying (3θ − 2 − π2) < 0. From (22) δ ≤ 1/2 must




(3θ − π2) . (D.11)
From (24) any triplet (θ,δ,π2) such that the (n,o) equilibrium exists satisﬁes furthermore











(D.12) is decreasing, in the relevant range, in π2 and so we have D ≥ 0. To see that
welfare in the (n,n) equilibrium is strictly greater than in the (n,o) equilibrium if π1 > 0
observe that (D.9) is strictly increasing in π1. It is clear that (D.12) is strictly positive
if π2 < 1.  
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